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I argue that in order to apply the most common type of criteria for logicality, invariance
criteria, to natural language, we need to consider both invariance of content—modeled
by functions from contexts into extensions—and invariance of character—modeled,
à la Kaplan, by functions from contexts of use into contents. Logical expressions
should be invariant in both senses. If we do not require this, then old objections
due to Timothy McCarthy and William Hanson, suitably modified, demonstrate that
content invariant expressions can display intuitive marks of non-logicality. If we do
require this, we neatly avoid these objections while also managing to demonstrate
desirable connections of logicality to necessity. The resulting view is more adequate as
a demarcation of the logical expressions of natural language.
1. Introduction
The standard semantic definition of logical consequence, due to Tarski (1936),
relies upon selecting in advance a fixed set of logical expressions. We usually
do this by enumeration, treating the logical constants in a typical logic textbook
as logical and those not not. Since this suffices for applications, many rest con-
tent here. However, when we turn to accurately characterizing the concepts of
logical truth and logical consequence as they appear in the informal background
language with which we actually do mathematics, things get more complicated.
Philosophers and logicians have thus attempted to give a philosophically ade-
quate account of why ‘and’ and ‘all’ are logical, why ‘denounced’ and ‘Deniz’ are
not, and that settles in a reasonable way disputed cases like = and ‘uncountably
many’. The most widespread such account takes logical expressions to be those
whose meaning does not depend on the characteristics of particular objects.
The best precise development of this account of logical expressions identifies
them with expressions whose extensions are always invariant under some class
of transformation such as permutations (Tarski 1986), isomorphisms (Sher 1991),
strong homomorphisms (Feferman 1999), potential isomorphisms (Bonnay 2008),
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etc. The extension of an expression φ is invariant, under some transformation T,
just in case applying T to the extension of φ in a context to does not “change”—
in some sense—the extension of φ. This type of approach, dating back to Tarski
(1986) and Mautner (1946), and in some sense, to Kant’s view of logic as an
abstraction from the content of judgments (MacFarlane 2002; Tolley 2013; Stang
2014), has a number of useful connections with definability (McGee 1996), and
seems to capture at least one sense in which the meaning of logical expressions
are immune to the particular features of the objects they are applied to.
Though this approach is commonly applied to formal languages, it is sub-
ject to intuitive counterexamples, due to Willian Hanson (1997) and Timothy
McCarthy (1981), when it is attempted as an analysis for natural language ex-
pressions. Their examples show that the meaning of a natural language expres-
sions can stay constant while its T-invariant content intuitively varies, in a sense,
from context to context. Though there are problems with their examples, ex-
posed recently by Gil Sagi (2015), we can reconstruct versions of their examples
which do work to demonstrate their point. In light of this, I argue that applying
invariance criteria to expressions of natural language, as opposed to formal lan-
guages, requires distinguishing two ways in which the meaning of expressions
can be immune to the particular nature of the objects they are applied to. Do-
ing so not only solves a number of problems, such as the reconstructed versions
of McCarthy and Hanson’s examples, but also highlights important connections
between logicality and necessity.
1.1. Invariance Criteria
To see how these approaches to logicality work, consider Tarski’s preferred no-
tion of invariance: permutation invariance. Simplifying slightly, we can model
the relevant notion of context, for this limited purpose, as a set of objects (com-
monly called a domain), and then take the extension of expressions on a domain
D to correspond to set-theoretic constructions from D—unary predicates corre-
sponding to subsets of D, binary relations to subsets of D×D, unary quantifiers
to subsets of the powerset of D, etc. The general extension of an expression is a
function from the set of domains to set-theoretic constructions of the appropriate
type over these domains. For example, the general extension of ‘is a cat’ is the
function whose value for any domain D is the set of cats in D. In the actual
context—ours—the extension of ‘is a cat’ is simply the set of cats. The general
extension of ‘for all’ is the function whose value for a domain D is {D}. The gen-
eral extension of ‘there is a’ is the function whose value for a domain D is the set
of non-empty subsets of D.
Given a permutation pi, we define pi+, a function on set-theoretic construc-
tions out of D, as follows: pi+(e) = {pi+(d)|d ∈ e} and pi+(e) = pi(e) if e ∈ D.
Then we can say that the general extension of φ is permutation invariant just
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in case, for every permutation pi and every domain D, φD (the extension of φ
on D) does not change when we apply pi+ to it—i.e., when pi+(φD) = φD. So,
the general extension of the universal quantifier ‘for all’—which can be mod-
eled by a function from domains to their singletons—is permutation invariant
since permuting D results in D, (i.e., pi+({D}) = {D}). The general extension
of the predicate ‘is the greatest Polish logician’, on the other hand, is not per-
mutation invariant as there is a permutation pi on a Tarski-containing domain
D such that pi(Tarski)=Starsky. Given this permutation, pi+(‘is the greatest Pol-
ish logician’D) = {pi(Tarski)}={Starsky}.1 A little work establishes that all truth-
functions, the existential and universal quantifier, the identity relation and the
non-identity relation, and cardinality quantifiers are permutation invariant.
Although invariance-type accounts of logicality are common, their justifica-
tion as useful indicators of logicality is slightly difficult to pin down. The rough
background thought for the case of permutation invariance is put well by Vann
McGee:
Any operation which is disturbed by a permutation must somehow dis-
criminate among individuals in the domain, and any consideration which
discriminates among individuals lies beyond the reach of logic, whose
concerns are entirely general. (1996: 567)
McGee’s idea, I take it, is that the formal notion of invariance measures, some-
how, how much the general extension of an expression carries information about
individuals. Truly logical expressions, such as those found in the usual logic
books, have extensions which do not change when we swap around the facts
concerning individuals in the context in which they are applied. The extensions
of expressions like ‘cat’, ‘sat’, and ‘Matt’, however, can change rather dramati-
cally. This is supposed to show that the “meanings” of non-logical expressions,
in at least one sense of meaning, encodes information about the underlying types
of objects they apply to, whereas the “meaning” of logical expressions encode no
such information.
Formal criteria for logicality, such as permutation invariance, are really crite-
ria that apply to model-theoretic surrogates for natural language meanings. Some-
times, we can more or less identify the model-theoretic surrogates for natural
language meanings with their actual meanings. Perhaps this is true for mathe-
matical language; perhaps it is true of a reformed language of science like that
dreamed of by both Frege and the logical positivists. Sometimes, we need to care-
fully distinguish mathematical models of meaning from meanings themselves,
such as when we deal with natural language in all of its modal, aspectual, and
colored character. However, either way, formal criteria for logicality inform our
choices in modeling natural meaning by telling us which expressions we ought to
1. For details and extensive further discussion, see Woods (2014).
Ergo · vol. 3, no. 30 · 2016
Characterizing Invariance · 781
treat as logical expressions in our models. In particular, it tells us that we should
treat as logical those expressions whose meaning, as modeled by our formal mod-
els, is invariant—i.e., those expressions whose general extensions are invariant.
It is also important to note that invariance criteria are immanent, not transcendent
criteria—they presume that the metatheoretic resources with which we describe
the semantic features of expressions are already understood. It would be desir-
able to avoid this property, but it is entirely unclear how to do so.2
The formal criteria tells us to treat these expressions as logical because their
meaning, as modeled by the model-theoretic surrogates, displays a property
which we take to represent the intuitive property we assign to the natural lan-
guage meaning of these expressions. Transformations model ways in which
the underlying context could be different: permutations model how we could
swap around the facts concerning the objects in a domain, isomorphisms model
how we could swap around which objects have which features and, additionally,
which objects there are, so long as there are the same (cardinal) number of them,
etc. T-invariance, then, for some class of transformation T, represents a property
of the meaning of certain expressions—that their meaning is not dependent on
particular features of the objects in the domain. So long as we have successfully
modeled the meaning of the relevant expressions and so long as T-invariance
really does represent the intuitive property of non-dependence on particular fea-
tures, we are licensed in claiming that the actual meaning of these expressions
really does display this intuitive property of logicality.
Inspection of the justification just sketched, though, suggests that using per-
mutation invariance as the relevant transformation is simply too narrow. There
are definable permutation-invariant general extensions which correspond to intu-
itively non-logical meanings, so permutation invariance is not the most discrim-
inating criterion we could apply.3 Consider, for example, the wombat quantifier,
whose extension on domains with wombats is the same as that of the universal
quantifier, but the existential quantifier on domains suffering from wombatless-
ness (McGee 1996). Even though the extension of this operator on each domain
is permutation invariant, which extension it has depends quite heavily on non-
logical information about the domain, such as whether it contains wombats. In
order to screen these types of operators out and to have a more discriminating cri-
terion, theorists have generally opted for transformations between domains, such
as isomorphisms.4 It is easy to show that even though McGee’s funky quantifier
2. I do not have space here to discuss the relationship between semantic criteria and
proof-theoretic criteria for logicality. My aim here is to make more plausible the best going
semantic criteria, not to argue against entirely alternative approaches.
3. Although Woods (2014) and Dutilh Novaes (2014) further argue that permutation
invariance is not even necessary for logicality. The former argues that the criterion can be
patched. The latter does not.
4. In this context, an isomorphism between domains is simply a bijection. The reader is
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is permutation invariant, it is not isomorphism invariant.
Note that since extensions which fail to be permutation invariant eo ipso fail
to be isomorphism invariant, McGee’s example does not show that permutation
invariance is not a necessary condition. It merely shows that it is insufficiently
discriminating to be the most useful guide to logicality. More could and has been
done to narrow the class of logical expressions by choice of transformations, as
work by Feferman (1999) and Bonnay (2008) testifies to. Perhaps isomorphism-
invariance is not the best choice of transformation for this approach to logicality.
Nevertheless, for simplicity, we will focus on isomorphism invariance in what
follows as my overall point does not turn on which type of transformation be-
tween domains we choose.5 I will flag below where the limitations of isomor-
phism invariance crop up (Sections 3–4), though I will note at the outset that
we could relieve some of these limitations, at the cost of significant complexity,
by moving to a more discriminating transformation such as Feferman’s strong
homomorphisms. Taking isomorphism invariance as the relevant transformation,
we can put the standard invariance criterion as follows:
Simple Invariance An expression φ is logical only if its extension is iso-
morphism invariant.
I will presume that, insofar as it goes, simple invariance does capture a type of
independence of the meaning of logical expressions from particular features of
objects they are applied to. Defending this approach to logicality is beyond the
scope of this essay; my primary aim here is to improve it.6
1.2. Invariance and Meaning
Of course, the conception of meaning which is modeled by merely by the exten-
sion of expressions is impoverished; this has sat badly with a number of people.
Surely, we might think, in order for an expression to be logical, its real mean-
ing, not merely its extension, needs not discriminate among the objects in the
cautioned to keep this unfortunately well-established terminological choice in mind below and
when reading the literature on invariance criteria generally.
5. Many theorists, such as Sher (1991), use invariance as only one necessary criterion in a
list of jointly sufficient criteria for being a logical expression. I discuss Sher’s view extensively
below, but it is worth noting at the outset that isomorphism invariance is clearly the principal
criterion on the list and has been taken as more-or-less a necessary and sufficient condition
(perhaps with the addition of Sher’s point about rigidity, described below) by many after her.
6. Recent work by Tim Button and Sean Walsh (in press) suggests that this defense will
require more than might initially be thought; in particular, one needs to argue in detail that
the sort of non-dependence picked out by isomorphism invariance (or a close cousin) really
does capture an intuitive non-dependence property characteristic of the meanings of logical
expressions. I remain hopeful that this can be done and hope, in particular, to address their
objections and their relation to the work here in another venue.
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relevant domain.7 This complaint isn’t just that extension invariance is insuffi-
cient for a full account of logicality for natural language. The real complaint
is that extensions are inadequate as an account of the meaning of expressions,
even if sometimes the extension of an expression adequately models the natural
language meaning.
Timothy McCarthy (1981) and William Hanson (1997) have offered compelling
arguments along these lines against the invariance criterion when used as an ac-
count of the logicality of expressions (in the way described above).8 Their com-
plaint is that we can use non-logical materials to fix the extensions of expressions
in a way which intuitively modifies the logical properties of their meaning, but
which does not modify the invariance properties of their extensions. Their argu-
ments go roughly as follows:
1. Invariance is a formal property applying to extensions of expressions, not
their meanings.
2. The extension of an invariant expression can be fixed by non-logical ingre-
dients.
3. Expressions whose extensions are fixed by non-logical means are thereby
non-logical.
4. Therefore, invariance of extension is insufficient for the logicality of an
expression.
(1) is established by inspection of the definition of (simple) invariance; (2) can be
established by looking at semantic rules for certain stipulated operators, defined
over contexts as follows:
(N) ∀c[‘Nφ′ holds at c↔ (‘φ’ holds at c iff ¬K)] (McCarthy 1981)9
where K is some contingent actual truth; (3) is prima f acie plausible, given that
defined operators like N seem to display non-logical behavior (see below), and
7. I am here privileging what Bonnay (2008: 6) calls the formality argument. I do not mean
to suggest that this is the only way into the invariance criterion; see Bonnay’s discussion of
the generality argument and the relationship between the two of them. The issue of what these
joint arguments support is aimed at picking which transformations matter rather than at my
question below about whether we should be concerned with invariance of extensions, meanings,
or both, so I will bracket it.
8. Few have seriously criticized the invariance criterion in its original Tarskian usage as a
way of discriminating a set of logical (set-theoretic) objects from non-logical objects, though see
(Button & Walsh in press: Chapter 8). See Sher (2001; 2003) for a useful reminder that we ought
distinguish the two projects. I offer some reasons to broaden the Tarskian criterion in Woods
(2014), but even these are meant as a modification, not a rejection of Tarski’s approach.
9. I have switched McCarthy’s talk of structures for talk of contexts throughout to generalize
the point and emphasize that little depends on how we represent the intuitive idea.
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(4) follows from (1–3). The essential upshot is that invariance criteria fail to cap-
ture aspects of the meaning of expressions that plausibly can interfere with their
logical character and, hence, are at best a weak necessary condition of logicality.
Gil Sagi, in recent work, has criticized these arguments (Sagi 2015). Although
Sagi’s criticisms of this argument are instructive, there is nonetheless a way to
understand McCarthy’s and Hanson’s arguments—and, in particular, to under-
stand (3)—that avoids Sagi’s objections and which is compelling against versions
of the invariance criterion (Sections 2.1, 4). Let me be clear: I accept Sagi’s criti-
cisms against a certain way of taking McCarty and Hanson’s arguments; so con-
strued, the arguments fail. Yet, viewed another way, we can rescue the point that
McCarthy and Hanson are drawing out attention to and, in so doing, give a more
plausible account of how to use invariance as a criterion for logicality.10 I take
part of the implicit, if not explicit, point of McCarthy and Hanson’s arguments
to be that we need to take a broader view of meaning to obtain an adequate gen-
eral account of logical expressions for natural language. This has gone relatively
unnoticed as philosophers interested in logicality are usually interested in distin-
guishing between logical and non-logical expressions in languages which have
an extensional flavor, such as a large fragment of mathematical language.
Below, I use Sagi’s discussion to elucidate the way in which simple invari-
ance falls short of a characterization of logicality for natural language expres-
sions; namely, by being defined only over an impoverished account of meaning
(Section 2). We can do better than simple invariance by adding to invariance
of extension—as used by simple invariance—a requirement that logical expres-
sions also have invariant meanings (cashed out here in terms of Kaplanian char-
acters, though the point is general.) Roughly, we will say that a Kaplanian char-
acter for an expression φ is isomorphism invariant when, fixing its content at
a context of use c, applying any index-preserving isomorphism i from c to d re-
sults in the content which would have been fixed for φ at d (further technical
details are put off until the appendix; the intuitive idea should suffice for now.)
Both types of invariance are important; each represents different aspects of how
logical expressions are insensitive to the underlying natures of objects.
1.3. Broadening Meaning, Broadening Invariance
We start by putting away an initial suggestion. Moving to a slightly more en-
compassing picture of content, such as intensions (i.e., functions from contexts
to particular extensions), will not solve this problem. Inspection of the above
example from McCarthy will show that it can be taken as laying down a function
from contexts to truth-functions. If that content is itself invariant, in the relevant
10. I believe that Hanson’s argument, as opposed to McCarthy’s, is best interpreted in the
way that I will suggest. However, as my point is not to explicate McCarthy or Hanson’s prose, I
shall leave interpretive issues at that.
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sense, then McCarthy and Hanson’s point stands since N is still intuitively non-
logical. So we need an even more encompassing notion than that of an intension
to capture the point that McCarthy and Hanson are making. In fact, since we
will deal here with languages which do not contain modal expressions and since
we are taking the relevant form of transformation to be isomorphism invariance,
we can avoid worrying overmuch about the difference between intensions and
extensions, taking the intension of an expression to be invariant when its exten-
sion, in every context, is invariant (i.e., identifying intensions with what I called
above ‘general extensions.’) For unmodalized languages, this suffices.11 So I will
henceforth talk in terms of contents—that is, general extensions—being invariant
and contrast this with meanings being invariant.
The key to addressing McCarthy and Hanson’s complaint is to broaden the
target notion of meaning in a different direction. Distinguish between contexts of
evaluation of a statement—contexts where it is evaluated for truth and falsity—
and the context of use of a statement—the context where we assert it, utter it,
or what have you.12 These can come apart: my assertion that I’m writing at
the moment is true when evaluated in its context of use, but not true when
evaluated at many other contexts, such as the one where I’m sensibly taking a
mid-afternoon constitutional.
What is causing the problem in the above example is that invariance of con-
tent tracks insensitivity of the meaning of logical expressions to features of ob-
jects in contexts of evaluation whereas invariance of meaning ought to track insen-
sitivity of logical expressions to both features of objects in contexts of evaluation
and in the context of use. I will develop this point below, but for now it suffices
to note the distinction between these two roles that context can play.
Now if logical expressions really have extensional meanings, then their mean-
ings won’t change even if we apply our transformation to the context of use. But
if we are concerned to isolate the class of logical constants within natural lan-
guage, then we ought not presume the extensional character of logical expres-
sions at the outset, but hope that it follows from criteria which are motivated by
underlying intuitions about the nature of logic, such as the insensitivity of logic
to the particular features of things. Taking content invariance—insensitivity to
the nature of things in the context of evaluation—as our criterion does not secure
this result as examples like McCarthy’s demonstrate. I will discuss in more detail
below the construction of expressions with non-extensional meanings which are
nevertheless content invariant.
11. Dealing with modalized language adds an entire layer of complexity; I hope to return
to this complexity in future work.
12. Nota Bene: ‘contexts of evaluation’ are not the same as the modern-day relativist’s
contexts of assessment; rather, these are what Kaplan calls circumstances. Moving to a third
role for contexts, assessment in the relativist’s sense, opens the possibility for a third type of
invariance. I hope to return to this issue elsewhere. Thanks to Julien Murzi for discussion.
Ergo · vol. 3, no. 30 · 2016
786 · Jack Woods
Some theorists, such as Sher (1991), avoid this worry by stipulating that we
consider only extensions when introducing logical expressions for a constructed
(extensional) logical language.13 Accepting this condition presupposes that the re-
sulting expressions will be extensional; part of the implicit point of Hanson and
McCarthy is that if we do not presuppose this, then we can define expressions
which rigidly denote isomorphism-invariant objects, yet whose intuitive mean-
ing is not extensional. So, even if our task is to lay down conditions on how to
introduce logical notions into logical languages, we ought to also impose invari-
ance of meaning as a constraint instead of stipulating that we only consider the
extensions when introducing logical expressions. The alternative of presuppos-
ing that all logical notions are extensional undermines much of the interest in
invariance criteria as an explication of the nature of logical expressions. Sher’s
stipulation may be adequate for her purposes, but it seems ad hoc if our aim is a
general semantic criterion for logical expressions in, and introduced by, natural
language. (See Section 2.2).
In brief, I claim that we can make sense both of invariant extensions and invari-
ant meanings—construed in terms of Kaplanian characters—and that invariance
of both sorts is required for an expression to be logical in the fullest sense.14 So,
presuming that isomorphisms are the right transformation here, I advocate:
Double-Standard Invariance An expression φ is logical only if both the
content and the character of φ are isomorphism-invariant.
as a more plausible version of the invariance criterion. And, even if one rejects
invariance criteria as a full account of logicality, I advocate Double-Standard
Invariance as at least a necessary condition on logicality as it has significant
theoretical payoffs:
• Double-Standard Invariance does a better job at isolating the logical con-
stants than simple invariance in contexts where we allow that meaning
comes apart from general extensions. (Sections 2.1, 2.2)
• Double-Standard Invariance has desirable connections not only to ordi-
nary necessity, but so-called deep necessity. (Section 3)
• Logical truths involving only character-invariant expressions, such as those
meeting Double-Standard Invariance, are plausibly a priori graspable as
true from a grasp of the meaning of the constitutive expressions, explicat-
ing the sense in which logical truths are a priori (subject to caveats discussed
below). (Section 3)
13. See Sher’s (1991: 54–56) discussion of condition (B).
14. I use Kaplanian characters for simplicity, but the approach could be adapted to different
semantic pictures. Bonnay, in his dissertation, suggests a similar approach using a Stalnakerian
approach to content; I hope to discuss the relation between these two approaches elsewhere.
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• Double-Standard Invariance explains and entails a desirable rigidity con-
straint that other theorists have imposed on logical expressions. (Section
4)
• The two standards making up Double-Standard Invariance, content and
character invariance, are unified in the sense that both represent types of
insensitivity to particular objects. (Section 5)
My aim is not criticism of any particular theorist’s version of the invariance
criterion; as will become clear below, theorists have been somewhat sensitive to
points in this area (Sher 2001). However, Double-Standard Invariance explains
certain restrictions we might place on logical expressions in terms of something
more fundamental such as character invariance. My methodology is thus to first
use Sagi’s discussion to elucidate the need for character invariance and argue for
the appropriateness of considering both types of meaning when investigating the
logical properties of expressions (Sections 2–2.2). I then turn to connecting up
character and content invariance with the modal and epistemic properties that
Hanson and McCarthy’s arguments suggest logical expressions ought to have
(Section 3), and use the results to reformulate their argument in a way immune
from Sagi’s criticisms. In Section 4, I discuss reasons to prefer Double-Standard
Invariance over the combination of something like Simple Invariance and a
constraint implying that logical constants are rigid designators. Sher (1991) uses
a combination like this for logical languages; my main point in Section 4 is that
for natural languages, it is insufficient. I close by drawing together the reasons
to prefer Double-Standard Invariance to Simple Invariance and, finally, in
a brief appendix, I lay out some technical details of the connections between
invariance and necessity.
2. Sagi’s Response to McCarthy and Hanson
Sagi distinguishes two distinct versions of McCarthy and Hanson’s arguments,
the modal and the epistemic, which focus on different ways to motivate and un-
derstand the third premise. On the modal interpretation, it claims that if the
extension of an expression is fixed by non-logical materials, then it is possible
for logical truths to be false, contra the extremely plausible claim that logical
truths are necessary.15 On the epistemic interpretation, the third premise claims
15. The objection is not that classical “logical” truths like ∃x x = x, which are intuitively
contingent, come out necessary—this is unavoidable given the assumption that domains are
non-empty and, perhaps, a pragmatic justification of this could be given. It is rather that some
logical truths will come out as contingent on this way of specifying logical expressions even if
we hold cardinality facts fixed. For discussion of truths constructed out of logical materials
which are equivalent to facts about the size of the domain, see Woods (2014: 302–303).
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that if we fix the extension of logical expressions by a posteriori materials, then
there will be logical truths which we could not know a priori since we could not
know, in the absence of some a posteriori knowledge, that the logical truth is true.
McCarthy’s and Hanson’s arguments are about the logical properties of ex-
pressions in natural language. This is clear from context; if it were simply an
abstruse model-theoretic property at issue, arguments involving the intuitive ne-
cessity of ‘logical’ expressions and the a priori status of certain truths involving
them would be out of place. So when we distinguish between the metalanguage
with which we define certain constants and the object language in which they are
defined, we are really distinguishing between two ways of taking our own lan-
guage or some rigorized version thereof, at least in some salient cases. We are
distinguishing between the language with which we introduce an expression (call
it PseudoEnglish1) and the resulting language under study in which it has been
introduced (PseudoEnglish2). I shall understand McCarthy’s and Hanson’s exam-
ples this way in what follows. One reason for this, suggested above, is that iden-
tifying logical expressions only for a rarified collection of formal languages is of
significantly less interest than identifying logical expressions in natural language
or close analogues thereof.16 Note, briefly, that we have said little at this point
about the details of PseudoEnglish1—it may contain non-extensional expressions
or it may not—and the character of legitimate definitions in PseudoEnglish1—
these may contain non-extensional expressions or they may not.
Sagi objects to the modal interpretation by pointing out that Nφ ↔ ¬φ, a
statement of PseudoEnglish2, actually is necessarily true. Yes, if K were false,
the statement expressed by the sentence ‘Nφ ↔ ¬φ’ would not have been nec-
essarily true, but this would be a case in which the PseudoEnglish1 definition of
N yielded an expression with a different meaning, resulting in a new language
PseudoEnglish3. The PseudoEnglish3 statement N ↔ ¬φ is false, but what of it?
PseudoEnglish3 is a different language. In brief, Sagi argues, correctly in my view,
that if we distinguish the sentence ‘Nφ ↔ ¬φ’ from the interpreted statement
Nφ ↔ ¬φ, we can see that the former could have been false, but not the latter.
But the possible falsity of the former is not of any interest. Against the epistemic
interpretation, she again notes that the sentence ‘Nφ↔ ¬φ’ can have its meaning
determined by semantic rules involving a posteriori materials without obviously
transferring the a posteriori status onto the statement so determined. Sagi refrains
from pursuing the epistemic objection on grounds that it would require saying
far more about the a priori.
I agree with both of Sagi’s worries. Her objection to the modal interpretation
is obviously cogent and her worry about the transference of a posteriori materi-
als from the account of the meaning of an expression to the a posteriori status
of logical truths involving this expression is apt. We can, however, give an al-
16. For relevant discussion, see Section 4 below.
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ternative version of the argument which skirts Sagi’s objections. Hanson is best
understood as claiming that Sher’s account allows that the logical status of the
extension of an expression may crosscut the logical status of its meaning (Hanson
1991: 393–4). And McCarthy puts the upshot of his argument as follows:
If logical constanthood is a semantic property, the semantic description
of a logical constant is not completely determined by the class of func-
tions it introduces; for the suggested examples provide us with semanti-
cally distinguishable constants that are associated with the same function.
(McCarthy 1981: 516)
So, again, if the relevant sense of meaning for the logical status of expressions
is not exhausted by general extensions, then Sagi’s defense is incomplete when
viewed as a defense of simple invariance as a criterion for logicality for expres-
sions of natural language.
2.1. Rejiggering Hanson and McCarthy’s Examples
Let us introduce some machinery to capture the aspects of meaning that Mc-
Carthy and Hanson are concerned with. Following Kaplan (1989), we can treat
the contents of expressions as functions from contexts of evaluation to extensions.
Meaning, on the other hand, we will take to be character, where the character of
an expression is a semantic rule which can be modeled by a function from con-
text (of use) to contents.17 The character of the first-person pronoun, for example,
is the semantic rule:
‘I’ refers to the speaker (of the context of use)
Some expressions, such as ‘water’, arguably have constant characters—from any
context of use, the content of ‘water’ is the function from contexts of evaluation
to the water within. Others, such as ‘I’, are not constant, even though the content
of the expressions is rigid in Kripke’s sense—in any context of use, ‘I’ takes us
to the constant function from context of evaluation to the actual speaker of the
context of use. That is, the content of ‘I’, uttered by me, is the constant function
which takes every context to me, but the content of ‘I’, uttered by you, is the
constant function which takes every context to you. It is important to note that
speakers can grasp the character of an expression without fully grasping its con-
tent. As famously noted by Kaplan (1989) and Perry (1979), we may not know
17. For Kaplan, strictly speaking contents model the notion of a propositional constituent (the
sort of thing figuring in a proposition), whereas characters model the notion of a semantic rule.
For our purposes here, we can occasionally speak with the vulgar and identify what is modeled
with what models it. They will be distinguished where it matters. Thanks to Eliot Michaelson
for discussion.
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which object in particular ‘I’ refers to while knowing it refers to whoever spoke
it. Eavesdropping, I may not know that the content of ‘I’, for example, refers to
Jack while knowing full well it refers to whomever said it. This ignorance of the
particulars of the context of use is sufficient to destroy our grasp of the content
of ‘I’ without destroying our grasp of its character.
For many expressions, there is no substantive difference between the char-
acter and content of the expressions involved—at least on one plausible picture
of how the meaning of intuitively non-logical expressions works (Kaplan 1989).
On the rival picture, many expressions have non-constant character, much like
indexicals, but this will not often affect the invariance properties of the content
since both the character and the content of intuitively non-logical expressions
will be variant (Jackson 1998). Either way, when we are dealing with such ex-
pressions, we need not worry overmuch about distinguishing between character
and content. But when we explicitly define semantical rules and view these as
meaning-constitutive, as Sagi suggests we interpret Hanson and McCarthy as
doing, then we need to worry about the difference between context of use and
context of evaluation and, correspondingly, the difference between character and
content. In different contexts, we can use an expression defined by the same
semantical rule without a difference of meaning—i.e., a difference in character—
just a difference in content.
Consider again the sort of example that McCarthy used to make his point. We
have a true contingent claim, K, and we lay down the following excruciatingly
explicit definition of an expression, ‘N’, speaking PseudoEnglish1:
(N) ∀c∀φ[‘Nφ’ holds at c↔ (‘φ’ holds at c iff ¬K)]
resulting in an extended language, PseudoEnglish2. Now, given that K is true
in our context of use—the context of definition—what this says is that in any
context of evaluation c, Nφ is satisfied if and only if ¬φ is. That is, (N) specifies
a function from contexts of evaluation to the truth-function ¬ (the truth-function
taking us from T to F and conversely); this is the content of ‘N’ in PseudoEnglish2.
Now, what about its character? Settling this requires distinguishing between
two ways of interpreting definitions like (N). We could treat the definition as
conditional—if K is true, we have defined N as coextensional with ¬; if K is false,
we have defined N as coextensional with the trivial functor τ taking us from T
to T and similarly for F.18 This is to read (N) as laying down an expression with
constant character; so read, N does not shift its meaning from context of use to
context of use. If this is how we are to read N, then I am entirely in agreement
with Sagi that there is no sense to be made of how Nφ ↔ ¬φ could have been
18. Nota Bene: (N) is not an abbreviative definition in PseudoEnglish1. Sagi is right to
distinguish that case from the case of definition in a metalanguage. It is in this latter sense I
intend both interpretations of (N).
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contingent given that K is actually true. If Nφ ↔ ¬φ is false, it must be that we
defined N in a context of use in which K was false. Then it’s logically false and
so because we speak a different extension of PseudoEnglish1, PseudoEnglish3, in
which N has a different meaning. But this conditional interpretation is not the
only way to understand this type of definition.
We could alternatively understand (N) as directly specifying in PseudoEnglish1
a semantic rule—the character of N—resulting in a context-sensitive operator in
PseudoEnglish2.19 When I say N is context-sensitive, I mean that its content can
change from context of use to context of use, not that its character or meaning so
changes. Rather, like ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’, the meaning of N is given by a partic-
ular semantic rule and, given a particular context of use, it has constant content,
just as with the first-person indexical. Regardless of how we should understand
McCarthy’s and Hanson’s definitions, we can explicitly define an expression this
way. Given an contingent claim K, I hereby specify the character of (Ni), as a
semantic rule thus:
(Ni) ∀c[‘Niφ’ holds at c↔ (‘φ’ holds at c iff ¬K)]
The content of Ni, given that K holds at the actual world of our context, is ¬, but
in another context, it could be the trivial functor τ. But it does not follow that Ni
has a different meaning in that context insofar as we take meaning to be given
by character, not content.
Note that we could make the same point by introducing an indexical term
directly. Suppose, starting with a language which did not contain the first-person
indexical, we laid down the following definition of it:
(I∗) ∀c[‘I∗’ refers, at c, to the speaker]
This definition, as with our definition of N above, could be interpreted in at
least two importantly distinct ways.20 Read as a conditional definition, it speci-
fies a term with constant character which refers at any context of evaluation to
the speaker at the original context of definition. Read as a specification of a se-
mantic rule, it lays down a term with shifting character which, at any context
of evaluation, refers to the speaker at the context in which I∗ was used. From
some contexts of use, I∗, when its definition is interpreted as laying down a
context-sensitive semantic rule, has different content than from other contexts
19. (N) does not explicitly make use of any non-extensional materials; that is, abstracting
from the quantification over contexts necessary to make clear which expressions are being used
and which are being mentioned, none of the content of the semantic rule is non-extensional. We
could, of course, use non-extensional materials in laying down the definition, without changing
the overall point in the slightest.
20. ‘Speaker’ could also be interpreted as elliptical for ‘speaker at c’. This is not the
intended reading, so put it aside.
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of use. Speakers from these differing contexts nevertheless speak the same lan-
guage even though their uses of I∗ have different contents, just as you and I are
speaking the same language and using expressions with the same meaning when
we each utter the sentence ‘I’m talking here.’ As with I∗, so with Ni.
Now, Niφ ↔ ¬φ is dependent, in a sense, on contingent materials—since K
is true in the context of use, Niφ ↔ ¬φ is necessarily true, but it would not have
been true, necessarily or otherwise, had we evaluated the semantic rule for Ni
in a different context of use. Yet Ni rigidly refers (in the sense specified by Sher,
discussed below); its content, once fixed by a context of use, is the same in every
context of evaluation, just like ‘I’ (for more discussion, see below). As long as a
significant portion of meaning has to do with such semantic rules, we can make
sense of one way a claim like Niφ ↔ ¬φ is contingent, even though it is true no
matter which context we evaluate it at.
2.2. The Relevant Sense of Meaning
Should we assume, though, that this is the right sense of meaning for logicality?
As I pointed out above, it seems to me that we have strong methodological rea-
sons to start with a notion of meaning which is adequate to analyzing natural
language—if our task is to identify the logical constants of a natural language
or even a quasi-natural language like that used in philosophical contexts, then
we should not presume at the outset that all such logical expressions will have
purely extensional meanings. Rather, we should start with the natural concep-
tion of meaning for the language under consideration, especially such language
that figures into arguments we might be interested in assessing for validity, and
see if explicating intuitions about the properties of logical expressions returns
the result that their meaning is extensional.
Viewed this way, it seems inescapable that the relevant sense of meaning
encompasses more than extensions. We can, after all, reason from ‘I am here’
to ‘someone is here’ or from ‘There is a tall student in my class’ to ‘There are
tall students’. We mis-analyze the meaning of the premises if we treat indexical
terms like ‘I’ or gradable adjectives like ‘tall’ as having extensional meanings
or even intensional meanings even when we could capture the validity of these
arguments by so doing. In fact, a wide variety of arguments philosophers are
interested in analyzing involve indexical expressions as well as actuality and
tense operators, their locative analogues such as ‘here’ and ‘now’, and the like.
Why should we restrict our account of logical expressions, before we even start
our investigation, to those expressions particularly focused on in the fragment
of the initial formalization of logical languages aimed at representing proofs in
mathematics?
Even in that rarified domain, we may note that there are expressions which
can be usefully theorized about by distinguishing between character and content.
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e, treated as an arbitrary choice operator, is one nice example.21 Plausibly indef-
initely extensible notions like ‘definable’ or ‘ordinal’, which can be treated as
having different meanings at different stages-of-definition, are another. Taking
a broader picture of meaning, even in mathematics, potentially gives us a better
sense of why certain expressions are well-treated as logical-in-the-fullest sense
and why certain expressions which are like these in some senses, but not others,
are better seen as not being logical in the fullest sense.
A related reason for not identifying the relevant sense of meaning for logi-
cality as well-modeled by general extensions is that doing so occludes different
senses of logicality. “Logical truths” of the logic of demonstratives, like ‘I am
here now’, exhibit a number of marks of logicality. They are indifferent, in a
sense, to the underlying natures of the objects they are applied to, even though
they are not isomorphism invariant. Likewise, it seems to me that we could take
a permissive stance on operators like Ni and claim that they are also logical in
a weak sense—they exhibit some, but not all, of the marks of logicality. When
we distinguish invariance of character and invariance of content, we can explain
why certain operators are only logical in a relaxed sense—they’re only halfway
invariant. Logicality in the fullest sense requires invariance of both content and
character since these model two different ways the meaning of an expression
could be sensitive to the natures of objects. But doing so requires that we recog-
nize, at the outset, the two senses of meaning on offer.
So it is best to assume that the relevant sense of meaning is not exhausted
by extensions or intensions. Summarizing the discussion so far, definitions, like
that of McCarthy’s N, can be viewed as determining not only content, but also
character, corresponding to a semantic rule specified by the definition. And since
we can define—even in an extensional PseudoEnglish1—expressions with charac-
ters which characterize distinct, yet invariant contents in different contexts of use
without changing their meaning, there is a prima facie mismatch between the in-
variance of the content of expressions and the logicality of expressions. This mis-
match is made more plausible by the contingency—in a sense—of some truths
marked logical by the content invariance criterion and our inability to justify
such as logical truths by a priori methods. Our account of the meaning of a logical
constant should thus involve both the character of the constant and its content.
The upshot is not that we should avoid using the invariance criterion in order to
account for logicality, but rather that this criterion should be applied to both the
21. I have argued elsewhere that we should recognize arbitrary choice operators like e
as logical operators in more-or-less the fullest sense and shown that it is possible to set up
a principled account of the denotations of expressions which does so (Woods 2014). The
character/content distinction, however, provides a fallback position for those, like Breckinridge
and Magidor (2012) who treat such operators having a standard, though arbitrarily specified,
denotation. They can treat the choice of an arbitrary representative for each predicate as part of
the context and let e have invariant character and wildly variant content.
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character of an expression and its content. Only if both are invariant should we
regard the expression as logical.
3. Contingency and Invariance
A secondary aim of McCarthy and Hanson’s examples is emphasizing that ne-
cessity, in some form, is itself a criterion of logicality. Logical expressions, intu-
itively and traditionally, should yield truths which are necessary (Hanson 1997).
The necessity of logical truths is, presumably, supposed to be a consequence of the
insensitivity of logical expressions to the natures of objects they are applied to.
At least, a criterion of the logicality of expressions which entailed that all truths
composed only of logical expressions were necessary would be all the more plau-
sible. This because it would capture one important criterion of logicality on the
basis of a plausibly more fundamental criterion of logicality. However, there is
a problem here. We now have two senses of meaning—content and character—
in play and, correspondingly, two senses of insensitivity in play. Invariance of
character, even intuitively understood, does not guarantee necessity in the usual
truth-at-all-worlds sense. This can easily be seen by noting that ‘I am here now’
is not necessary in the usual sense—possibly, I’m not. From the other direc-
tion, assuming the Kaplanian framework, we can lay down semantic rules for
expressions like Ni whose content will invariably be invariant, but where which
invariant content is denoted is determined, in a context of use, by contingent
matters at the context of use; unlike ‘I am here now’, whether or not such claims
will be true depends on which context we utter them from.
As a result, there are two senses in which a claim like Ni[∃x x = x] ↔ ¬[∃x
x = x]22 can be necessary: a sense corresponding to truth at all contexts of evalu-
ation and a sense corresponding to truth at all contexts of use. These two senses
are familiar from the distinction between deep and shallow necessity drawn by
Evans (1979) and Davies and Humberstone (1980). Slightly simplified, a sentence
φ is shallowly necessary if and only if:
∀c φ@(c) = T
That is, when the content of φ determined at the actual context @ is the constant
function from contexts to true. A sentence φ is deeply necessary if and only if:
∀c φc(c) = T
that is, when, for every context c, the content of φ determined at context c is true
at c. Note that this distinction may, but need not, track any fancy view about
22. I have switched our leading example here to one constructed entirely out of logical
expressions so as to connect this discussion cleanly with the results proved in the appendix.
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actuality, content, and contexts as possible worlds. In order to make the relevant
distinction, we merely need that there is a way to track contexts of use which fix
the content of a notion and contexts of evaluation for that content.
Of course, given the way we have set up the criterion of logicality, there will
be many true sentences which are composed only out of logical expressions, but
which are not necessary. For instance, ∃x, y x 6= y, which expresses that there are
at least two objects, is true but not shallowly necessary since there are at least
two objects here, but there are contexts of evaluation containing only one object.
Likewise, it is not deeply necessary since there are some contexts of use where it
also fails. Yet it contains only content and character-invariant materials. This is
a quite general problem, but one which we can finesse for now; our target will
be to capture a sense in which claims composed only of logical materials are, if
true, necessary. We will thus relativize the sense of necessity to contexts whose
domains are isomorphic; i.e., we’ll say that a sentence φ is shallowly necessaryinv
if and only if:
∀d[φ@(d) = T → ∀c ∼= d φ@(c) = T]
that is, when the content of φ determined at the actual context @ is true at a
context d only if it is true at every context isomorphic to d. For deep necessity,
we say a sentence φ is deeply necessaryinv if and only if:
∀c[φc(c) = T → ∀d ∼= c φd(d) = T]
that is, when the content of φ determined at a context @ is true at @ only if the
content of φ determined at any isomorphic context d is true at d.
Failure of shallow necessityinv undermines logical truth (Hanson 2006). If
a claim is not shallowly necessary, then its truth can vary from context to con-
text, even when these contexts contain the same number of objects. And this
kind of contingency seems to sit badly with the idea that logic is topic-neutral
on one disambiguation of this claim—that is, that the truth of a logical truth is
immune to swapping around facts about the relations with a context. Logical
truths, especially those constructed from purely logical expressions, should be
true in whatever context we evaluate them from, unlike ‘there are orange cats’.
However, certain statements which are not shallowly necessaryinv are still neces-
sary in some sense, such as ‘I am here now’ or ‘I exist’. These are true when they
are evaluated in the context of use and are thus deeply necessaryinv in the sense
defined above.23
Plausibly, deep contingencyinv also undermines logical truth. If a claim is
deeply contingentinv, then its content varies from context of use to context of
23. This is to disagree with those who hold that logical truths can be shallowly contingent
(Zalta 1988). The matter is too detailed for this paper, but see Hanson (2006) for what strike me
as conclusive reasons to reject Zalta’s claim.
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use, even if its character stays constant. This kind of contingency sits rather
badly with the idea that logic is topic-neutral on a different, but highly plausible
disambiguation of this claim—that the content of a logical notion is immune to
worldly facts about the context of use. Logical truths, especially those constructed
from purely logical expressions, should be true wherever we assert them from,
unlike ‘I am over six feet tall’ and potentially unlike ‘There are no unicorns’.
Call a claim that is necessary in both senses strongly necessaryinv. Truths con-
structed from character- and content-invariant materials are strongly
necessaryinv. Ni[∃x x = x] ↔ ¬[∃x x = x] is not. If its content is fixed in
a K context, it is true and (shallowly) necessarilyinv so. From a ¬K context,
it is false and (shallowly) necessarily so. So it is shallowly necessaryinv and
deeply contingentinv. On the face of it, Hanson’s and McCarthy’s intuition that
Niφ ↔ ¬φ is not intuitively necessary seems probative and corresponds to the
failure of strong necessityinv. True claims constructed from purely logical expres-
sions should be always true—from any context of use, at any context we evaluate
it at, modulo our above point about the size of the context—because their truth
depends only on the meaning of logical expressions, no matter where the con-
tents of these expressions are fixed.
We thus need an explication of topic neutrality which guarantees that the
meaning (character) of the components of these truths are such that no matter
what context we assert or define them, they turn out to be true at every point of
evaluation given that context. We obtain this result by following the suggestion
above, and requiring that logical expressions not only have invariant contents,
but also invariant characters. (See the appendix for precise definition of these
notions.) Double-Standard Invariance—claimed here only as a necessary, not
a sufficient condition—again does a far more plausible job at carving the logical
from the non-logical.
3.1. Reconstructing Hanson and McCarthy’s Arguments
We can now reconstruct the modal argument against simple invariance: content-
invariance, while entailing shallow necessityinv, allows for deep
contingencyinv, but logical truths should not be deeply contingentinv. That is:
1. Invariance properties, as currently understood, apply to contents of expres-
sions, not their meanings (understood as characters).
2. The character of an expression, understood as a semantic rule, can involve
non-logical ingredients which still results in invariant contents.
3. Sentences involving expressions whose invariant contents are fixed by char-
acters that involve non-logical ingredients can turn out to be
deeply contingentinv.
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4. Logical truths should not be deeply contingentinv.
5. Therefore, invariance of content is insufficient for logicality of an expres-
sion.
This argument avoids Sagi’s objections to Hanson’s and McCarthy’s modal
argument while staying true to the intuitive force of it.
Turning to the epistemic argument against the invariance criterion makes
even clearer the role of character in accounting for logicality. PseudoEnglish1 defi-
nitions of character like that of Ni are such that we can fully grasp them without
being able to judge what content they specify. On the conditional interpretation
of (N), we do not grasp the character of N—we merely grasp what the (constant)
character would be given K and what the character would be given ¬K. But we
can fully grasp the character of (Ni) without knowing what the content specified
by that character is. If we do grasp what content is specified by that character, it
is due to knowing some additional shallowly contingent materials such as K.
But grasp of the character of the logical constants—understanding their
meaning—should allow us to suss out a priori that the logical truths generated
from them are true, again presuming that we are in a position to know how many
objects there are.24 If we accept this as a constraint, then we obtain the following
version of the epistemic argument:
1. Invariance properties, standardly understood, apply to contents of expres-
sions, not their meanings (characters).
2. The character of an expression, understood as a semantic rule, can involve
deeply contingentinv materials.
3. If a sentence φ contains an essentially occurring expression γ whose char-
acter involves deeply contingentinv materials, then even if the content des-
ignated is invariant, we may not be able to grasp that φ is true even if we
fully grasp the character of γ and how many things there are.
4. The truth of truths constructed only from logical expressions should be
derivable from a full grasp of the character of the essentially occurring
constitutive expressions and a grasp of how many things there are.
5. Therefore, invariance of content is insufficient for logicality of an expres-
sion.
We should view these arguments as instructive in how to develop the invari-
ance criterion in the less rarified context of non-extensional languages. If simple
24. This is essentially the complaint raised by Hanson (1997) against Sher’s account. It also
potentially explicates a sense in which logical truths are analytic.
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invariance is insufficient for logicality in such contexts, as I have claimed along
with Hanson and McCarthy, then we need something else to fill the gap. In-
variance of character fills that gap nicely; hence, double-standard invariance
looks to be the appropriate invariance-criterion for non-extensional languages.
4.An Alternative Approach: Sher’s Rigidity Constraint
Gila Sher, in her seminal discussion of invariance criteria (1991), proposed that a
conditions of being a logical constant is that it rigidly denote its extension:
Condition (B) ensures that logical terms are rigid. Each logical term has
a pre-fixed meaning in the metalanguage. This meaning is unchangeable
and is completely exhausted by its semantic definition. That is to say,
from the point of view of Tarskian logic, there are no “possible worlds”
of logical terms. Thus, qua logical terms, the expressions “the number
of planets” and “9” are indistinguishable. If you want to express the
intuition that the number of planets changes from one possible “world”
to another, you have to construe it as an extralogical term. If, on the
other hand, you choose to use it as a logical term (or in the definition
of a logical term), only its extension counts, and this is the same as the
extension of “9”. (Sher 1991: 56)
Sher’s stated aim is a characterization of logical constants in logical languages
(2003: 197) and, in particular, logical languages of a Tarskian stripe. This moti-
vates Sher to obtain rigidity by requiring that constants be defined by a single ex-
tensional function and identified with their extensions. Though Sher’s condition
works nicely for the languages she considers, the restriction to them seem less
than perfectly motivated for a general account of logical constants. Why, for ex-
ample, should we require that our metalanguage definitions of logical constants
be extensional? Likewise, why only consider logical languages which can be so
treated? Typical logical languages and accounts of logical expressions are often
like this, but this fact should be explained. Anyways, our aim is the broader one
of characterizing logicality for natural language. This may not be Sher’s project,
but is one for which her claim about rigidity is useful, if not perfectly apt.25
25. Though it is not always entirely clear what her project is. In recent work, she claims that
something loosely analogous to Simple Invariance gives a necessary and sufficient answer
to the question “Which choice of logical constants will give rise to a logical system whose
consequences transmit truth from premises to conclusion with an especially strong modal
force in all fields of knowledge?" (2014: 182) But, if that is the question, then the restriction to
extensional languages is very implausible since it is not at all obvious that we can formulate
adequate logical systems for all fields of knowledge in extensional terms. Double-Standard
Invariance, absent this restriction, would seem to be a better answer to this question though
perhaps not a sufficient condition.
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Logical constants should be rigid in Sher’s sense; non-rigid expressions, even
when they have invariant extensions, are not intuitively logical.26 Sher’s point
seems to be that expressions which change their meaning from world to world
are intuitively non-logical expressions. Logical expressions should be rigid, but
as we have seen above, once we move to the Kaplanian framework described
above, there are two senses of meaning on offer. Rigidity captures the idea that
the content of an expression is constant over worlds, but it does not capture the
sense in which character is constant over context. ‘I’, famously, is a rigid desig-
nator of me; it denotes at every world, though in a different context, it would
denote you in every world. Likewise, ‘Ni’ is rigid, denoting either the trivial
functor or negation, though which is a function of whether or not K is actually
true. We seem to need here rigidity both of content and of character to capture
the sense in which the meaning of logical expressions does not change.
So Sher’s account, even if adequate for the particular logical languages she
is considering, seems less adequate for our purposes than one which takes se-
riously her (and others, such as Feferman, McGee, and Hanson’s) informal re-
marks about meaning and develops an independent criterion which underwrites
her point about rigidity. Sher is aware of this limitation. She remarks in her
(2001) that it matters little for her purposes, but significantly for other purposes,
whether we ban empirical logical predicates—predicates which rigidly denote in-
variant extensions, but are defined by reference to contingent empirical mate-
rials.27 However, adding a demand for character invariance to the account of
logicality is better than banning such empirical predicates or treating them as a
special case, even given her aims. It explains in a general and illuminating way
why we should mark such predicates as non-logical.28
As any character- and content-invariant expression will be rigid in Sher’s
26. It is clear from her later discussion that Sher doesn’t think that counterexamples
involving constants which have different meanings on domains of different cardinality, such as
McGee’s (1996) funky disjunction, are non-rigid in her sense. Similar problems affect content-
and character-invariant expressions, as discussed above (Section 3). As a referee points out,
once we have identity and the existential quantifier as logical constants, finite cardinality
quantifiers will be logical so these counterexamples don’t have much force. Of course, this
leaves non-finite cases, but anyways, it strikes me that so much as there is a problem here, it is
one which should be solved by choosing a more appropriate class of transformation—such as
those of Bonnay (2008) or Feferman (1999).
27. Her concessive remark is directed at the inability to know, a priori, the meaning of
certain empirical logical predicates, not at the case of empirical materials playing a role in
specifying the character of an expression.
28. Feferman has also argued, in two ways, for two-pronged approaches to logicality. In his
(2010), he argues that logical notions should be set-theoretically absolute in order to avoid being
beholden to a background account of set theory. In his later (2015), he argues that there should
be a proof-theoretic analogue to the semantic notion of invariance. I am sympathetic with both
claims, viewing them as arising similar dissatisfaction with pure invariance criteria, but space
precludes discussing them here. I hope to compare my approach with them elsewhere.
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sense, but not conversely, the double-standard I am advocating seemingly im-
proves on Sher’s useful point above about rigidity in the context of natural lan-
guages. In fact, as the double-standard I advocate above implies rigidity in her
sense,29 we lose none of the cases Sher wants to exclude by means of her rigid-
ity constraint, but additionally fend off intuitive counterexamples to Sher’s view
like Ni.30 We can thus see double-standard invariance as a way of making
sense of Sher’s point in non-extensional contexts.31
5. Conclusion
Taking stock, I have argued that there are defensible versions of McCarthy and
Hanson’s modal and epistemic arguments against simple invariance, arguments
that strongly suggest we ought to adopt double-standard invariance instead.
The modal argument goes by way of claiming that invariance of content is insuf-
ficient to guarantee deep necessityinv, but that deep necessityinv should hold for
any truth containing only logical expressions. The epistemic argument goes by
way of showing that grasp of the character or semantic rule for logical constants
is insufficient to determine a priori that truths constructed out of them are true.
But this also seems required for logicality.
Deep necessityinv and a priori discoverability from grasp of the character of
an expression are, by themselves, insufficient for logicality. Consider ‘I am here
now’. This is deeply necessary—from any (normal) context, our assertion of
this will be true. We can infer this fact a priori from our grasp of the meaning
(character) of ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’. Likewise with other ‘logical’ truths of the
logic of actuality and the logic of indexicals. But though ‘I am here now’ is
deeply necessary, ‘Necessarily, I am here now’ is false. I might not have been.
And logical truths should not be contingent in this way.32 Shallow necessity, as I
have argued above, is arguably insufficient for logicality as well. A joint demand
seems preferable since all truths constructed from standard logical expressions
are necessary in both senses (subject to the ‘inv’ modifier discussed above.)
29. Though, like expressions rigid in her sense, not sameness of denotation in every world
unless we use a transformation other than isomorphism.
30. However, this is not to say that we can exclude all the cases which might be troublesome.
See Footnote 34 below.
31. Sher also has a programmatic reason to aim only at logical languages and to not care
about empirical predicates as she is primarily interested in worldly formal structure. Space is
too limited to discuss this here, but note that even if logical constants are formal in this sense,
it doesn’t follow that all formal notions can be grasped using only extensional resources. See,
though, McGee (1996) for technical reasons to think that all standard logical objects can be
defined using only extensional resources.
32. For a sensible discussion of logical truth in a Kaplanian context, see Michaelson (2014:
530–531).
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For many mathematical and logical definitions, the distinction between char-
acter and content collapses. But once we look to define expressions for natural
language, which contains more complex expressions such as indexicals, we can
and should separate content and character. Once we have done so, it seems clear
that simple content invariance is insufficient for logicality. And this I take to be
at least part of the lesson of Hanson’s and McCarthy’s examples.
6.Appendix – A Sketch of Character Invariance
We sketch here the formal details of the notion of character invariance and the
connection of invariance to necessityinv, working with an unmodalized language
for simplicity.33 Let W be a non-empty set and D a function from W into a family
of non-empty sets. We will call w ∈ W a world (since it is our surrogate for ways
things could have been) and Dw the domain of w. Let D∗ =
⋃
w∈W Dw. We build
a type-hierarchy over D∗ in the usual way. A context is a pair 〈w, s〉 of a member
w of W and an object s ∈ Dw (the speaker). Given a language L, we interpret
expressions in L by assigning them contents according to the character of the
expression, given a context. General extensions—contents in the sense we’ve been
using—can be modeled by functions from W to members of the type-hierarchy
built over D∗, appropriately to semantic type and member of W. The type of a
unary predicate is, for example, a function from D∗ to {T,F}, the type of a unary
and monadic quantifier being a function from functions from D∗ to {T,F} to {T,F},
etc. A character is modeled by a function from contexts to contents.
So, for example, the character of ‘I’ is the function that takes a context 〈w, s〉
to the function from each member ofW to s. The character of ‘cat’, being constant,
is the function that takes a context 〈w, s〉 to the function from W to members of
the type-hierarchy over D∗ such that w 7→ f where:
f (a) = T ⇔ a is a cat in w.
The character of =, again being constant, is the function that takes a context
〈w, s〉 to the function fromW to members of the type-hierarchy over D∗ such that
w 7→ f where:
f (〈a, b〉) = T ⇔ a = b.34
Likewise, the character of ‘there are’, also being constant, is the function from W
to members of the type-hierarchy over D∗ such that w 7→ f where:
f (g) = T ⇔ {a |g(a) = T} ⊆ Dw and {a |g(a) = T} 6= ∅.
33. Various simplifications employed here make it simpler to give an idea of how to proceed,
but the general suggestion is clearly portable to different semantical pictures.
34. The reader will note that this means that ‘a = b’ can be true at w even if a does not exist
at w. Such is life in modal semantics.
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Finally, the character of Ni is not constant, being modeled by the function:
g(〈w, s〉) =
{
v 7→ ¬ K is true at w
v 7→ id{T,F} K is false at w
As usual, when the function picked out is a characteristic function—i.e., one
whose range is a subset of {T,F}—we will treat it as the set; a unary predicate
being the subset of D∗, a binary relation being a subset of D∗ × D∗, a unary
quantifier being a subset of ℘(D), etc.
Since all objects occurring in a domain of a world occur in D∗ and we’ve
drawn our contents from D∗, we will treat bijections between domains of worlds
in terms of permutations on D∗ (that there will be many permutations of D∗ for
each bijection from Dw to Dv will cause no problem given our purposes). Given
a permutation pi of D∗, we extend it to a function pi+ on all members of the type-
hierarchy over D∗. We set pi+(T) = T, pi+(F) = F, and for w ∈ W, pi+(w) = w.
For all d in D, let pi+(d) = pi(d). For an ordered n-tuple 〈m1, . . . ,mn〉 of members
of the type-hierarchy,
pi+(〈m1, . . . ,mn〉) = 〈pi+(m1), . . . ,pi+(mn)〉.
Given a function f on types, pi+( f ) is the function composed of pi+, f , and the
inverse of pi+: pi+ ◦ ( f ◦ pi+−1 ).
We say that a content co is isomorphism invariant on W and D when for any
permutation pi on D∗ and pair of worlds w and w′ such that pi+(Dw) = Dw′ :
pi+(cow) = cow′
We say that co is simply isomorphism invariant when it is isomorphism invariant
on W and D for any W and D. The content of the predicate ‘stockbroker’ is not
isomorphism invariant. Given our actual world, @, the slightly better world w in
which there are more revolutionaries and fewer stockbrokers and a permutation
pi on D∗ such that pi+(D@) = Dw, pi+(broker@) 6= brokerw. On the other hand,
it is easily verified that, for any permutation pi, a pair 〈s1, s2〉 ∈ pi+(=@) just in
case 〈pi+(s1),pi+(s2)〉 ∈ =w, and so = (the content of identity) is isomorphism
invariant; this case, however, is borderline uninteresting as the content of = is
the same on every w ∈ W. A more interesting case is ‘there is’, and here it is
again easily established that for any permutation pi such that pi+(Dw) = Dv,
A ⊆ Dw just in case pi+(A) ⊆ Dv and A ⊆ Dv just in case pi+−1 (A) ⊆ Dw, so the
set of non-empty subsets of Dv is the same as result of applying pi+ to the set of
non-empty subsets of Dw.
We need an additional bit of apparatus for character invariance. Let an @-
and-s preserving map from 〈w, s〉 to 〈w′, s′〉 be a pair pi,piω such that
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(1) pi is a permutation of D∗,
(2) piω is a permutation of W,
(3) pi(s) = s′ and pi+(Dw) = Dw′ ,
(4) piω(w) = w′.
So pi permutes D∗ while preserving the speaker-role, while piω permutes the set
of worlds, preserving the actual world role. We extend the pair pi,piω to a single
function pi+ in the obvious way.35
We say that a character ch, as modeled in the set of contexts drawn from W
and D, is isomorphism invariant for W and D when for any pair 〈w, s〉, 〈w′, s′〉
(w,w′ ∈W and s, s′ in D∗) and @-and-s-preserving map pi,piω :
pi+(ch〈w,s〉) = ch〈w′ ,s′〉
That is, where applying pi+ to the image of ch under 〈w, s〉—ch〈w,s〉—results in
ch〈w′ ,s′〉. We say that a character for an expression φ is isomorphism invariant
when no matter whatW and D we choose, the resulting modeling of the semantic
rule for φ as a function from contexts drawn from W to functions from W to the
type-hierarchy over D∗ is isomorphism invariant for W and D.
Now, given an @-and-s preserving map pi,piω between 〈@, me〉 and 〈@, Fred〉,
pi+(me)=Fred. I〈@,me〉 is the constant function from any w ∈ W to me, so pi+ of
I〈@,me〉 is the constant function from any w ∈ W to Fred. But, of course, this is
exactly I〈@,Fred〉. The invariance of the character of ‘I’ is borderline trivial given
our definition. But this is as it should be—invariance of character tracks the fact
that the semantic function of an invariant expression only depends on structural
features of the context, such as the designated speaker. It does not matter who
the speaker is, merely that there is one. We need @-and-s preserving maps here,
not simply permutations of D∗, since setting character invariance up in terms of
the latter would eradicate the possibility of invariance for notions like ‘I’ whose
content differs depending on the choice of speaker.36 The definition given above,
of course, generalizes for larger indexes, though we will need a corresponding
generalized notion of an index-preserving map. Here we will stick with the
simple speaker-only index.
35. If we were to work with a modalized language, we would need to complicate this
definition to accommodate additional modal expressions such as modal operators or the
actuality operator @. As MacFarlane (2000) has pointed out, this requires taking a stand on how
much modal structure—such as the accessibility relation—we should hold fixed. We ignore
such complications here for expository purposes.
36. Note that the invariance of a term like ‘I’ depends on us allowing any member of the
domain to count as a designated speaker or, alternatively, restricting the set of contexts to
proper contexts in which the speaker of a context is, say, a person. The former is preferable;
otherwise terms like ‘I’ carry significant non-logical information along with them—such as the
information that the speaker is a person. Such terms are not intuitively logical. We will thus
assume here that anything can serve as the designated “speaker” of a domain.
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Ni has variant character. Let K be false at w and true at @ and pi,piω an @-
and-s preserving map between 〈@, s〉 and 〈w, s〉. Ni〈@,s〉 is the function such that
Ni〈@,s〉(v) = ¬ for all v ∈ W. But pi+(Ni〈@,s〉) is Ni〈@,s〉 which is not identical to
the function Ni〈w,s〉—rather, N
i
〈w,s〉 is the constant function from w ∈ W to id{T,F}.
But both Ni〈@,d〉 and N
i
〈w,d〉 are (trivially) content invariant. In contrast, ‘I’ has
invariant character, but variant content. I〈@,me〉 = g where g is the constant
function from W to me. Now, given pi swapping only myself and Fred,
pi+(gv) = pi+(me) = Fred 6= gv
A little work shows that the usual logical constants, as well as standard cardinal-
ity quantifiers, have both invariant character and invariant content.
Call a statement shallowly stable just in case if it is actually true, it is shallowly
necessarilyinv true, and if actually false, shallowly necessarilyinv false. Being con-
structed entirely from content-invariant expressions implies shallow stabilityinv.
p f . Let φ be composed of only content invariant materials. Let w be
a world and φw = T. Without loss of generality, we will presume φ is
composed of two expressions, one of type S and one of type T, where S
composes with T. Let v be a world such that Dw ∼= Dv and φw = Sw ◦ Tw.
Since Dw ∼= Dv, there is a permutation pi of D∗ such that pi+(Dw) = Dv.
Let pi be such. pi+(Sw ◦ Tw) = pi+(Sw) ◦ pi+(Tw) (established by routine
induction), so, since S and T are by assumption content invariant:
pi+(Sw ◦ Tw) = pi+(Sw) ◦ pi+(Tw) = Sv ◦ Tv = φv
Since φw = T, pi+(Sw ◦ Tw) = T, so φv = T. Similarly for F.
Call an expression deeply stable just in case if it is actually true, it is deeply
necessarilyinv true and if actually false, deeply necessarilyinv false. Being con-
structed entirely from character-invariant expressions implies deep stability:
p f . Let φ be composed only of character-invariant materials. Let 〈w, s〉
be a context such that φ〈w,s〉(w) = T. Without loss of generality, let φ
be composed of two character-invariant expressions, S and T. Given a
context 〈w, s〉, φ〈w,s〉(w) = S〈w,s〉(w) ◦ T〈w,s〉(w). As before, for pi,piω a
@-and-s preserving map from 〈w, s〉, we have:
pi+ [S〈w,s〉 ◦ T〈w,s〉](u) = pi+ [S〈w,s〉](u) ◦ pi+ [T〈w,s〉](u)
If pi,piω is a @-and-s-preserving map from 〈w, s〉 to 〈v, t〉 and ψ a character-
invariant expression, then we have the special case:
pi+ [ψ〈w,s〉](v) = pi+[ψ〈w,s〉(w)]
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Since φ〈w,s〉(w) =T:
T = φ〈w,s〉(w) = pi+ [φ〈w,s〉(w)] = pi+ [φ〈w,s〉](v) = pi+ [S〈w,s〉](v) ◦pi+[T〈w,s〉](v)
Since both S and T are character invariant:
pi+ [S〈w,s〉](v) ◦ pi+ [T〈w,s〉](v) = S〈v,t〉(v) ◦ T〈v,t〉(v) = φ〈v,t〉(v)
So, stringing these identities together, we have
φ〈w,s〉(w) = φ〈v,t〉(v) = T
and similarly for F.
So if logical expressions are both character and content invariant—that is, if
they are strongly invariant—then sentences composed entirely of them are both
deeply and shallowly stable and hence strongly stable. Extending these methods
to mixed sentences and to modalized language awaits another opportunity.37
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